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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
NEW PARK MINING COMPANY and 
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and LLOYD REMUND, 
Minor son of CHARLES L. RE-
MUND, Deceased, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
8121 
Respondents agree to the statement of facts as set forth 
in Appellants' Brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
WHERE COMPENSATION FOR DEATH WAS 
AWARDED TO A DEPENDENT WIFE AND 
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CHILD, THE RE-MARRIAGE OF THE WIFE 
AFTER THE CHILD REACHED EIGHTEEN 
YEARS DOES NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF THE 
BALANCE OF COMPENSATION PAYABLE 
UNDER THE ORIGINAL AWARD, LESS THE 
LUMP SUM PAYABLE TO THE WIFE. 
ARGUMENT 
Since the Order of the Industrial Commission clearly 
sets forth the reasoning surrounding the award in this 
case, we respectfully suggest that the Court consider it as 
a part of this Brief. The Commission's Order (R. 6, 7 & 
8) sets forth the rule that the basic award does not termin-
ate when the last minor reaches the age of eighteen. It is 
interesting to note that this interpretation by the Industrial 
Commission has continued without interruption since the 
passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We must 
assume, therefore, that the Legislature is cognizant of the 
practice and has chosen not to legislate against it. This is 
contrary to the rule in approximately twenty jurisdictions 
throughout the United States, wherein the Legislatures have 
set by specific statutory enactment an age limit at which 
compensation lapses. See the compilation of jurisdictions 
having this rule as set forth in LARSON'S THE LAW OF 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Table 15. 
The sole question of importance in this case is whether 
or not compensation having once vested may be divested 
as the last dependent reaches eighteen, by an inference. 
Respondents submit that it is patent that the inference 
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must be clear and convincing and such that reasonable 
minds cannot differ. Had the Legislature ignored the 
problem completely, Respondents submit that Appellants' 
position would have some merit; but where the Legislature 
has recognized the problem and has dealt with it in a 
manner other than that desired by Appellants, the case 
against them becomes increasingly strong. 
Respondents have no doubts whatever that an award 
may be changed or reduced after the original Order, our 
Legislation is clear on this point. Respondents do, however, 
contend that the change or reduction must be in strict ac-
cordance with our statutes and not a matter of inference, 
speculation or conjecture. 
To accomplish their purpose, Appellants have tortured 
the plain meaning of the various statutory provisions by 
selecting those portions of the statutes in accord with their 
theory and disregarding that portion of the statute which 
orients the section in the legislative plan. Our Court has 
dealt with a similar problem in Silver-King Coalition Com-
pany, et al. v. The Industrial Commission, 116 P. (2d) 771, 
wherein the section that was then 42-1-64 (2) U. C. A. 
1943, and is now 35-1-68 (2) U. C. A. 1953, was being at-
tacked on the ground that the statute gave to two minor de-
pendents a larger weekly compensation rate than it would 
give to a widow and one minor dependent. The Appellants 
contend that logical interpretation would require the ad-
ditional 10% be given only where there is an adult de-
pendent in addition to minor children and that where there 
was no adult dependent, the 10% should commence with 
the second minor child rather than the first. This Court in 
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that case rejected the contention upon the plain reading of 
the statute, or, as was succinctly summarized by Justice 
Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in Johanson et ux v. Cudahy 
Packing Company, 120 P. (2) 281, 284: 
"In Silver-King Coalition Company vs. Indus-
trial Commission of Utah, 116 P. (2) 771, it was 
stated that where there was no ambiguity and it was 
not necessary to save the constitutionality or prevent 
absurdity, the language should be construed to mean 
exactly what it says." 
Section 35-1-71 is set forth as follows: 
"35-1-71. DEPENDENTS - PRESUMPTION. 
-The following persons shall be presumed to be 
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased em-
ployee: 
"(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she 
lives at the time of his death. 
" ( 2) Children under the age of eighteen years 
or over such age, if physically or mentally incapaci-
tated, upon the parent, with whom they are living at 
the time of the death of such parent, or who is leg-
ally bound for their support. 
"In all other cases, the question of dependency, 
in whole or in part, shall be determined in accord-
ance with the facts in each particular case existing 
at the time of the injury resulting in the death of 
such employee, but no person shall be considered as 
dependent unless he is a member of the family of 
the deceased employee, or bears to him the relation 
of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or 
brother or sister. The word 'child' as used in this ~ 1 
title shall include a posthumous child, and a child 
legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers 
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and half sisters shall be included in the words 
'brother or sister' as above used." 
This section of the Workmen's Compensation Act has 
been subjected to a great deal of interpretation. The Court 
most recently spoke on this section in Early, et al. v. In-
dustrial Commission, et al., 265 P. (2) 390, where it was 
held that the dependency provision set forth in sub-section 
(2) and inferentially sub-section (1), create a conclusive 
presumption of dependency, the other factors contained 
therein being satisfied. Contained within both of these sub-
sections are the words with whom she (or they) are living 
with AT THE TIME OF DEATH. The remainder of the 
sub-section dealing with non-presumptive dependents de-
termines the question of dependency at the time of the IN-
JURY RESULTING IN DEATH. The reason for the dif-
ference in the time of determining dependency, injury or 
death, is beyond the scope of this case, but needless to say 
this subject has received the attention of this and other 
Courts time and time again. Timewise, it is well settled 
that the question of dependency is determined at the time of 
death, or, at the time of the injury resulting in death. This 
is an inherent and necessary interpretation of our statute. 
See: Globe Grain & Milling Company, et al., v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 193 P. 642, cited by Appellants for 
other purposes. 
Appellants now say that we have a re-determination 
of the question of dependency when the last minor reaches 
eighteen and as authority for the proposition cite the 
statute referred to supra, which by an inseparable part 
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thereof refers us back to the date of death or to the date 
of injury resulting in death. This is somewhat akin to the 
problem of Renvoi in Conflicts of Law cases. Appellants 
contend that we are required to redetermine the depend-
ency of Lloyd Remund, yet our statute refers us back to 
the date of death or to the injury resulting in death. While 
an analogy to Renvoi is not technically correct, it serves 
to point out the invalidity of the Appellant's contention. 
The question of dependency was determined by the Indus-
trial Commission in its Order of October 22, 1951, based 
upon the circumstances of dependency existing at the time 
of death. The Appellant conceded in that determination and 
paid compensation thereunder. Their appeal time has run 
as to the question of dependency and the Commission's 
Order determining dependency is res ajudicata. Could we 
transpose the date of death or the date of injury to the 
time after the alleged dependent reaches eighteen years, 
we would have a valid application of the statute, but that 
is not the case before us. 
It is not without significance that the dependency pro-
visions of the Occupational Disease Act passed in 1941 and 
set forth as 35-2-30 (b) U. C. A. 1953, is identical with the 
provisions of 35-1-71 (2) with which we are concerned. Had 
the Legislature intended to incorporate the theory here pro-
posed, they had an excellent opportunity to express them-
selves. Instead, they adopted the theory and the language 
of the similar provisions of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act in the Occupational Disease Act. 
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A divesting provision is contained in Section 35-1-73, 
in that portion of the statute which is as follows: 
"Should any dependent of a deceased employee 
die during the period covered by SUCH WEEKLY 
PAYMENTS, the right of such dependent to com-
pensation under this title shall cease." 
Applying this provision to the case at hand, Lloyd 
Remund, or any other dependent for that matter, would 
lose their rights to compensation upon death. The section 
goes on to deal with the rights of a widow who remarries, 
making provision for a lump sum cash settlement of one-
third of the benefits remaining unpaid at the time of such 
re-marriage and providing for the remaining two-thirds 
of such benefits to such persons as the Commission may 
determine for the use and benefit of other dependents. 
Appellants infer that the use of the plural "dependents" 
creates an inference that the single dependent if over eigh-
teen years is to receive no further benefit. It is submitted 
that the rules of statutory construction require the in-
clusion of the singular within the plural and that the date 
of determining dependency is not the date of marriage but 
the date of death or injury resulting in death. 
By arguing inference, Respondents can point out that 
had the Legislature intended to divest a dependent of com-
pensation upon his reaching the age of eighteen, they 
might well have at least placed him in the same category 
as his mother, who on remarriage gets a one-third lump 
sum cash settlement. Or, had the Legislature intended to 
place some significance of the dependent reaching the age 
of eighteen years, they might have required the insurer to 
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pay the unexpended compensation into the special fund pro-
vided for in sub-division 1 of Section 35-1-68. 
Under Appellants theory, the lever which destroys 
the family unit is not the attaining of eighteen years, but 
the remarriage of the mother. Compensation would con-
tinue to the family unit, to which Lloyd Remund belongs, 
regardless of his age, until the mother re-marries or the 
six year period runs. The Legislature by this devise in-
tended to encourage a dependent widow to re-marry; it did 
not intend to make it a device to pauperize her minor son. 
The bounty of a stepfather may or may not include a step-
son. Certainly, a stepfather has no legal duty to support 
him. His mother deprived of independent income is unable 
so to do. Lloyd Remund looks to the remainder of the 
compensation award for his support and education in lieu 
of that normally furnished in whole or in part by his 
father. 
The Legislature in considering the problem of a de-
pendent reaching eighteen set a definite course of action 
for the Industrial Commission to follow. Section 35-1-74 
U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
"35-1-74. INCREASE OF AWARD TO CHIL-
DREN-EFFECT OF DEATH, MARRIAGE, MA-
JORITY, OR TERMINATION OF DEPENDENCY. 
-In all cases where the award of compensation is 
increased 5 per cent of the amount of such award for 
each dependent minor child, as provided in this title, 
such increase in the amount of the award shall cease 
at the death, marriage, attainment of the age of 
eighteen years, or termination of dependency of each 
such child." 
1: 
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Appellants argue in effect that the Industrial Com-
mission should follow the 5% reduction in cases where 
there are other dependents, but where, as in this case, the 
sole remaining dependent reaches eighteen, instead of reduc-
ing the balance of the award 5% it is reduced 100%. It is 
further argued, that since this was superimposed upon 
existing law by the Legislature, this is indicative of a 
legislative intent to divest compensation completely at the 
age eighteen. The plain, unmistaken and untortured mean-
ing of the Section is to eliminate the increase in the basic 
award on the happening of specified events, but to leave 
the basic award intact. Had the Legislature intended to 
divest compensation on the attainment of a certain age, here 
would be a logical place to do it. The Legislature in 1939 
when they added the parent section to then 42-1-69 U. C. A. 
1933 and again in 1945 when stating it as a separate sec-
tion 42-1-69.10 U. C. A. 1943, had an opportunity to put 
the theory of the Appellants into effect, the Legislature 
did not choose to do so. 
This Court in the case of Davis, et al. v. Industrial 
Commission, et al., (1945) 164 P. (2) 740, in denying an 
attack on the family unit doctrine, outlines a basic phil-
osophy which we may not disregard : 
"Family unit awards are, as a general rule, pre-
ferred. Section 42-1-69, U. C. A. 1943, provides that 
the award shall be paid to one of the dependents for 
the benefit of all dependents. There are instances 
when the awards may be apportioned but such cases 
are the result of special circumstances. In this case 
the Commission made the usual award to the family 
as a unit; such an award cannot be considered as an 
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award in which each dependent has title to a frac-
tional share. Each dependent has the same interest 
and the same right to an undivided benefit in this 
unit award. Every member of the family has a right 
to the privilege of enjoying the standard of living 
that would be afforded by the entire award. It is 
apparent that the children have no divisible interest 
for their marriage, becoming of age, or even death 
has no effect on the unit award. Section 42-1-64 (2), 
U. C. A. 1943. Certainly the rights of the three chil-
dren, who are United States citizens, in this indi· 
visible award cannot be affected by any act of their 
alien mother unless the statute so provides. There-
fore her expressing an intention to move, or her 
actual moving would not affect the award to the 
children. This gives rise to the question: What acts, 
if any, of the mother can or may affect or operate 
to reduce the amount of an award of which each 
child is entitled to the full benefit? Her death would 
not affect it; nor would any act she might perform 
with the exception of marriage. Section 42-1-64 (2), 
supra. The widow's interest in the award is in-
tangible and indivisible except upon an event that 
may or may not happen. Such interest confers on 
the wi .!OW n'o ~ndependent right or interest but in-
stead i;s rather a contingent claim or right or ex-
pectancy. This contingent right is incapable of 
transfer by grant or conveyance; such an interest 
is so intangible that it cannot be segregated. It 
follows that this award should not be apportioned 
or red r ced." 
Appellants argue that the situation before us should be 
treated specially and indicate that they do not attack a 
situation where there are other dependents. By their theory, 
lip service is given to the family unit doctrine, but we are 
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urged to treat the youngest member of the family in a 
manner different than the older members. 
We agree with the Appellants that the Legislature 
places great importance upon the age of eighteen years. 
However, the use to which the Appellants put it is entirely 
out of harmony with the theory of our Act. Those minors 
under the age of eighteen years have a conclusive presump-
tion of dependency, other conditions being satisfied, their 
rights to compensation vest. Appellants would have us 
use the test of eighteen years to divest previously awarded 
compensation. The whole of Appellants' theory is founded 
on this faulty premise. It is Respondents' contention that 
the Legislative policy of our Act is to put these matters at 
rest and although there are specific instances where the 
increases of an award may be subject to modification, the 
basic award is not subject to attack. To hold otherwise 
would result in constant collateral attack, as in this in-
stance. 
If the sole arguments availabk to thl-o;, Respondents 
were mere administrative convenience, we?feel that this 
would be sufficient to overcome a more persuasive infer-
ence than Appellants demonstrate to us. Re-determination 
of: a dependency status based upon conditions subsequent 
to the date of injury or death would be an eJrpensive, cum-
bersome process, especially to the Applicant. He is in no 
position to litigate on an equal basis with Insurance Com-
panies or self insurers. Sound legislative policy dictates 
that once a dependency status has been adjudicated it can-
not be terminated except by the occurrence of specified 
events spelled out by statute, not by an inference. 
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Re-determination of dependency upon the date of the 
re-marriage could result in the vesting of compensation 
benefits to those of a class who were not dependents upon 
the date of death or the date of injury. The rule contended 
for by the Appellants could become a two-edged sword, 
persons not dependent at the date of death could become 
dependent at a later date. The confusion is eliminated by 
determining the dependency status at the date of death. 
Appellants complain that the results of the Commis-
sion's Order are inequitable, slanting the entire argument 
to the proposition that new rights have vested in Lloyd 
Remund. By the Order of October 22nd, 1951, the insurer 
was required to pay the sum of $8080.44 compensation to 
the then dependents of the deceased. The obligation to pay 
that sum has not enlarged. It is the same identical obliga-
tion. The inequity of which they complain is an inability 
to escape it. Should Lloyd Remund die before realizing 
all the benefits, they will escape it, but until that event 
occurs there can be no change. The argument that a 17 
year and 364 day old only child may come into a sum of 
money as opposed to an eighteen plus year old child brings 
up the fundamental inequity of any statute which places 
a limitation on, or cuts off, rights. We must live with them, 
they are a part of our law. 
It is Respondents' contention that once compensation 
has vested under our law it runs the stautory length of 
time between the date of death, and not to exceed six years 
after the date of injury. See 35-1-68 (2) U. C. A. 1953. 
These facts are determined as of the date of the death. An 
obligation, definite in time and definite in amount, is as-
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sumed by the Insurer, no more no less. When the original 
award has run its course, the Legislature has made pro-
vision for additional benefits in special cases. Section 35-
1-70 is as follows: 
"35-1-70. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS IN SPE-
CIAL CASES.-If any wholly dependent persons, 
who have been receiving the benefits of this title, at 
the termination of such benefits are yet in a DE-
PENDENT CONDITION, and under all reasonable 
circumstances should be entitled to additional bene-
fits, the industrial commission may, in its discretion, 
extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability 
of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall 
not be extended, and the additional benefits allowed 
shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in 
subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
It is significant to note that the Legislature in setting 
up this provision chose to use the words "dependent condi-
tion" to describe the status of what we have been previously 
calling dependents. We argue that their choice of words is 
no accident, but was intentional to distinguish between de-
pendents at the date of death or injury from persons in 
need at the end of the compensation period. Even though 
the children of the deceased are in needy circumstances the 
Insurer is relieved of all further obligation, and the obli-
gation is assumed by the special-fund set up by statute. 
It is also interesting to note that even in cases where 
there are no dependents, the employer and/ or the insurer 
are required under 35-1-68(1) U. C. A. 1953 to pay the 
sum of $1800.00 to support the contingent fund referred to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
supra. So we see that there can be liability without de-
pendency. Had the Legislature intended to relieve the 
employer and/ or his insurer of their specific obligation 
they might well have ordered them to pay the unexpended 
portion into the contingent fund. 
The purpose in examining these various facets of our 
law is not to digress from the problem at hand, but to put 
the obligation of the Appellants in its proper perspective. 
The only divesting we find is the termination occurring in 
the case of the death of a dependent. The reasons for this 
are historical. It is to prevent the Estate of the deceased 
dependent from laying claim to the unexpended compensa-
tion benefits and destroying the family unit. The theory 
of the Appellants is an attack upon the family unit doctrine. 
It is submitted that under our law an amount is established 
at a specified time, it is increased percentagewise by the 
number of dependents, it is decreased likewise when the 
dependents reach the age of eighteen, marry or die. A 
lump sum may become due to a widow on re-marriage. The 
last dependent's death may lessen the liability of the In-
surer, but this, and only this will cut off the last dependent. 
When his status as a dependent has once been determined, 
subsequent events not spelled out by statute have no effect. 
To hold otherwise creates a special rule. There is no neces-
sity, nor is there any legal basis in the finest technical 
sense, for a separate rule in this type of case. The Legis-
lature gave compensation to this dependent by positive 
legislative enactment, we should not divest it by inference. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Industrial 
Commission in favor of Lloyd Remund and against New 
Park Mining Company and Pacific Employers Insurance 
Company should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
PETER M. LOWE, 
Deputy Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent, In-
dustrial Commission of Utah. 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE, 
ANDREW R. HURLEY, 
Attorneys for Respondent, Lloyd 
Remund, Minor son of CHARLES 
L. REMUND, Deceased. 
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